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The Fortification of Inequality: 
Constitutional Doctrine and the Political Economy* 
KATE ANDRIAS† 
INTRODUCTION 
Ours is an economy and a political system from which many ordinary Americans 
feel excluded; they feel forgotten by those in power, and they worry that their oppor-
tunities are declining.1 Their perceptions are based in reality. Numerous studies 
demonstrate the outsized influence of economic elites, both individuals and corpo-
rations, at every level of the legislative and administrative process.2 The organiza-
tions through which working-class Americans previously influenced politics have 
withered.3  
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Copyright © 2018 Kate Andrias. 
 † Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. For helpful feedback on this 
Essay, I am grateful to Sam Bagenstos, Justin Driver, Richard Primus, Margo Schlanger, and 
Laura Weinrib. Thanks also to Allison Hight and Marissa Perry for excellent research assis-
tance, to Hannah Clendening and the other editors at the Indiana Law Journal for their en-
gagement with this project, and to Dawn Johnsen for organizing the symposium. All errors are 
my own. 
 1. For a few recent news articles on point, see Nathaniel Persily & Jon Cohen, Americans 
Are Losing Faith in Democracy—and in Each Other, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/americans-are-losing-faith-in-democracy--and-
in-each-othr/2016/10/14/b35234ea-90c6-11e6-9c52-0b10449e33c4_story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/8DL4-Z2T5]; Greg Sargent, Why Did Trump Win? New Research by Democrats 
Offers a Worrisome Answer, WASH. POST: PLUM LINE (May 1, 2017), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/05/01/why-did-trump-win-new-
research-by-democrats-offers-a-worrisome-answer [https://perma.cc/HHL9-W367]; Sabrina 
Tavernise, Many in Milwaukee Neighborhood Didn’t Vote—and Don’t Regret It, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/us/many-in-milwaukee-neighbor-
hood-didnt-vote-and-dont-regret-it.html [https://perma.cc/HH7U-TP3M]. For a more in-depth 
account, see ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND 
MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN RIGHT (2016).  
 2. E.g., LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING: HOW CORPORATIONS 
BECAME POLITICIZED AND POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE (2015); MARTIN GILENS, 
AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN 
AMERICA (2012); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY, THE 
UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (2012); Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American 
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 576–77 (2014); 
see also Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and 
Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419 (2015) (collecting and analyzing literature). 
 3. Both labor unions and civic organizations more generally represent a fraction of their 
previous memberships, while political parties no longer function with significant grassroots 
participation. See JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 10–30 (2014); THEDA 
SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN CIVIC 
LIFE 128–74 (2003); Kate Andrias, Hollowed-Out Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 48 
(2014). 
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Meanwhile, income inequality in the United States is at its highest level since the 
period leading up to the New Deal.4 The top 1% of earners in the United States takes 
home nearly a quarter of our national income.5 The problem is not just the gap be-
tween the top and the bottom but the lived experience of the vast majority of 
Americans. Workers’ real wages have barely grown during recent decades, even as 
productivity has increased.6 Nearly one-third of workers earn less than $12 an hour, 
often with unpredictable schedules and poor working conditions.7 At the same time, 
economic mobility has declined, with elite education accessible disproportionately 
to the wealthy.8 The situation is most dire for people of color, particularly African 
Americans,9 but white Americans, particularly white men, have also suffered mount-
ing health problems and diminishing opportunities.10 And although economic indi-
cators have improved since the Great Recession ended in 2009, over 95% of the 
growth in the U.S. economy over the subsequent three years inured to the benefit of 
the top 1% of the income distribution.11  
Donald Trump was elected President in part because of this constellation of prob-
lems in the political economy, problems that I will refer to, in shorthand, as “economic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4.  See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 24 (Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., 2014). 
 5. See, e.g., id. at 23–24; ESTELLE SOMMEILLER, MARK PRICE & ELLIS WAZETER, ECON. 
POLICY INST., INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. BY STATE, METROPOLITAN AREA, AND COUNTY 
2, 7 (2016), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/107100.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3LQ-8ZCA]. 
 6. See LAWRENCE MISHEL, ELISE GOULD & JOSH BIVENS, ECON. POLICY INST., WAGE 
STAGNATION IN NINE CHARTS (2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2013/wage-stagnation-in-nine-
charts.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KFW-3DGS]; Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Long-Run 
Changes in the Wage Structure: Narrowing, Widening, Polarizing, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON 
ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 2, 2007, at 135, 135; Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel 
Zucman, Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States 2–4 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22945, 2016), http://gabriel-
zucman.eu/files/PSZ2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HFT-8TBJ]. 
 7. Michelle Chen, Trump’s Budget Proposal Is an Attack on the Working Class, NATION 
(Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/trumps-budget-proposal-is-an-attack-on-
the-working-class [https://perma.cc/C8QD-BQJE]. 
 8. See Raj Chetty, David Grusky, Maximilian Hell, Nathaniel Hendren, Robert Manduca 
& Jimmy Narang, The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility Since 
1940, 356 SCIENCE 398 (2017). 
 9. See Neil Irwin, Claire Cain Miller & Margot Sanger-Katz, America’s Racial Divide, 
Charted, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2014/08/20/upshot/americas-racial-divide-charted.html [https://perma.cc/3GTB-JXXD].  
 10. See Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Rising Morbidity and Mortality in Midlife Among 
White Non-Hispanic Americans in the 21st Century, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15078 
(2015); Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, The Increasing Significance of the Decline of Men, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/16/opinion/the-increasing-
significance-of-the-decline-of-men.html [https://perma.cc/K58B-4XQY] (collecting re-
search). 
 11. See EMMANUAL SAEZ, STRIKING IT RICHER: THE EVOLUTION OF TOP INCOMES IN THE 
UNITED STATES tbl.1 (2013), https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/33S5-ZD7W].  
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inequality.”12 Though economic inequality was by no means the only cause of 
Trump’s victory over Hillary Clinton,13 the 2016 election, like others around the 
globe, reflected voters’—and nonvoters’—widespread dissatisfaction with political 
elites and the economy they oversee.14 Indeed, both Trump and Bernie Sanders spoke 
directly to voters’ economic anxiety, channeling it in opposite directions.15 Mean-
while, many nonvoters, particularly in communities of color, stayed home due to a 
sense of economic and political impotence.16 Still others were discouraged or pre-
vented from participating in the election through a range of obstacles that dis-
proportionately burden the poor.17 
Unfortunately, every indication is that the problems in the political economy that 
shaped the 2016 election will only grow worse under Trump’s watch. The GOP ma-
jority in Congress, with Trump’s support, has sought to repeal much of the 
Affordable Care Act, reducing or eliminating access to health care for millions of 
Americans;18 to enact regressive tax reform;19 and to pursue legislation designed to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. I use the term “economic inequality” to refer to what is actually a collection of prob-
lems—rising inequality of income and wealth, stagnating wages, high poverty rates, and low 
social mobility.  
 13. I do not mean to suggest that economic and political inequality were the only or even 
the primary reasons for Trump’s victory; a plausible case can be made for a wide variety of 
causes. See Eric Levitz, New 2016 Autopsies: It Was the Obama-Trump Voters, in the Rust 
Belt, With the Economic Anxiety, N.Y. MAG.: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (May 2, 2017, 5:26 PM), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/05/it-was-obama-trump-voters-in-the-midwest-
with-econ-anxiety.html [https://perma.cc/S4SC-SRND]. Jamal Greene, writing for this sym-
posium, offers another explanation, not inconsistent with the argument of this Essay. Jamal 
Greene, Trump as a Constitutional Failure, 93 IND. L.J. 93 (2018). 
 14. See Justin Gest, The Two Kinds of Trump Voters, POLITICO MAG. (Feb. 8, 2017), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/02/trump-voters-white-working-class-214754 
[https://perma.cc/RX8U-AMF7]; John R. MacArthur, Opinion, Anger at Trade Deals Pro-
pelled Donald Trump to Victory, STAR (Nov. 29, 2016), https:// 
www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2016/11/29/anger-at-trade-deals-propelled-donald-
trump-to-victory.html [https://perma.cc/8RL6-89LJ]; Sargent, supra note 1. 
 15. Stephen Collinson, How Trump and Sanders Tapped America’s Economic Rage, 
CNN (Mar. 9, 2016), http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/09/politics/sanders-trump-economy-
trade [https://perma.cc/PS9X-MYQX]. Of course, it is worth noting the irony that Trump, a 
billionaire with a track record of poor employment practices, positioned himself as the spokes-
person for the American worker. See, e.g., Alexandra Berzon, Donald Trump’s Business Plan 
Left a Trail of Unpaid Bills, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2016, 4:52 PM), https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumps-business-plan-left-a-trail-of-unpaid-bills-1465504454 
[https://perma.cc/BQ37-ARK2]. 
 16. See Sargent, supra note 1; Tavernise, supra note 1.  
 17. Mona Chalabi, Who Are the Three-Quarters of Adult Americans Who Didn’t Vote for 
Trump?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news 
/2017/jan/18/american-non-voters-election-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/66GK-HED7]. 
 18. Robert Pear & Thomas Kaplan, Senate Rejects Slimmed-Down Obamacare Repeal as 
McCain Votes No, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2017/07/27/us/politics/obamacare-partial-repeal-senate-republicans-revolt.html [https:// 
perma.cc/93AK-R265].  
 19. See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017); A BETTER WAY, TAX (2016), https://abetterway 
.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/WK86-R62B]. 
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weaken unions and employment law.20 With few legislative victories to date, Trump 
has also engaged in a host of economically regressive executive actions. He has re-
scinded Obama-era executive orders protecting employees of federal contractors,21 
supervised the Department of Education’s decision to withdraw guidance aimed at 
reducing predatory student loans,22 ordered review of the Dodd-Frank Act and its 
consumer banking protections,23 and proposed a budget that would devastate poor 
communities and gut social welfare programs.24 
But what does any of this have to do with the U.S. Constitution? In the first year 
of the Trump administration, the energy of constitutional litigators and scholars fo-
cused elsewhere.25 And for good reason: Trump’s xenophobic and discriminatory 
immigration orders, his interference with ongoing criminal investigations, and his 
schemes for personal profit offend our most basic and widely shared constitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 
For a critique, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, Problems with Destination-
Based Corporate Taxes and the Ryan Blueprint (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 16-029, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2884903 [https://perma.cc/RDJ4-VWEF]. 
 20. See H.R.J. Res. 37, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted) (disapproving the Federal 
Acquisition Regulatory (FAR) Council regulations implementing the Obama Fair Pay and 
Safe Workplaces Executive Order); Sean Higgins, National Right-to-Work Bill Introduced in 
Congress, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 1, 2017, 2:53 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com 
/national-right-to-work-bill-introduced-in-congress/article/2613631 [https://perma.cc/SBE4-
DDBK]; Charlie May, Republicans Are Close to Killing Overtime Rules, Allowing 
“Employers to Cheat Workers” of Pay, SALON (May 3, 2017, 1:10 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2017/05/03/republicans-are-close-to-killing-overtime-rules-allowing-
employers-to-cheat-workers-of-pay [https://perma.cc/ZBL4-BS5S?type=image]; Jena 
McGregor, House Republicans Just Voted to Change Overtime Rules for Workers, WASH. 
POST (May 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/ 
2017/05/02/house-republicans-just-voted-to-change-overtime-rules-for-workers 
[https://perma.cc/L7P2-VC2R]. 
 21. Exec. Order No. 13,782, 82 Fed. Reg. 15,607 (Mar. 30, 2017).  
 22. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Trump Administration Rolls Back Protections for People 
in Default on Student Loans, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/grade-point/wp/2017/03/17/trump-administration-rolls-back-protections-for-people-in-
default-on-student-loans [https://perma.cc/X56T-LQTE]; see Susan Dynarski, The Wrong 
Way To Fix Student Debt, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (May 6, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/05/06/upshot/the-wrong-way-to-fix-student-loans.html [https:// 
perma.cc/3FBD-7GBA].  
 23. Exec. Order No. 13,772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 8, 2017).  
 24. E.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump’s Budget Cuts Deeply into Medicaid and Anti-
Poverty Efforts, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/05/22/us/politics/trump-budget-cuts.html [https://perma.cc/42GC-BFX5]. 
 25. See, e.g., Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (granting 
petitions for certiorari and granting, in part, applications to stay lower court preliminary in-
junctions against President Trump’s Executive Order banning immigrants from entry); 
Blumenthal v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-01154-EGS (D.D.C. filed June 14, 2017) (alleging viola-
tions of the Constitution’s Emoluments Clause); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. 
v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00458-GBD (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 23, 2017) (same). 
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principles.26 By contrast, the efforts of the Trump administration and GOP majority 
to redistribute wealth upwards—including by repealing health benefits, urging cor-
porate tax reform, and rolling back regulations that protect workers, students, and 
consumers—are generally considered policy choices, not constitutional problems.  
Of late, however, a growing body of legal scholarship has turned attention to the 
constitutional dimensions of economic inequality. Several recent books and articles 
have argued that growing economic inequality and related political inequality have 
significant deleterious effects on constitutional governance.27 Other scholarship has 
sought to revitalize arguments for treating laws that burden the poor with heightened 
scrutiny.28 This Essay will add to the growing literature by exploring how judge-
made constitutional doctrine has permitted and exacerbated the economic inequality 
that contributed to Trump’s rise in two areas: labor and education.  
Labor and education are by no means the only areas in which the Supreme Court 
has fortified inequality. Over the last decades, the Court has issued regressive deci-
sions in a range of areas including campaign finance, voting rights, regulatory tak-
ings, commercial speech regulation, access to justice, welfare law, abortion, and 
many others.29 But because labor and education are at the core of current debates 
about economic inequality, they provide a useful vantage point for examining the 
role of courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, in constructing today’s political 
economy. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. See James Hohmann, The Daily 202: Trump Shows Disdain for Rule of Law with New 
Attacks on Sessions, Rosenstein, Mueller, WASH. POST (July 20, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/daily-202/2017/07/20/daily-202-
trump-shows-disdain-for-rule-of-law-with-new-attacks-on-sessions-rosenstein-mueller/ 
596ffb2430fb0436795431bd [https://perma.cc/6R97-ETA3]; Elizabeth B. Wydra, Opinion, 
Defend the Constitution Against Trump, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 20, 2017, 1:30 PM), 
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/op-ed/articles/2017-09-20/this-constitution-week-defend-
our-founding-charter-against-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/L7NA-U6KM]; see also supra 
note 25. 
 27. See, e.g., GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION: 
WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC (2017); Andrias, supra note 2; Joseph 
Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669 (2014); 
Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 1445 (2016); Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy 
Constitution (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal).  
 28. See, e.g., Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class 
Determinations and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (2016); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, 
Political Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527 (2015). For the classic argument in favor of 
heightened protection of the poor, see Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—
Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 
(1969). 
 29. See Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. 
REV. 145, 160 n.72, 191 nn.247–50 (1998) (collecting cases from Berger and Rehnquist 
courts); Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 
4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-defining-
this-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/LW4P-PYAL] (summarizing literature on pro-cor-
porate decisions of the Roberts Court).  
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As Parts I and II of this Essay elaborate, the examination yields three observations 
of relevance to constitutional law more generally: First, judge-made constitutional 
doctrine, though by no means the primary cause of rising inequality, has played an 
important role in reinforcing and exacerbating it. Judges have acquiesced to legisla-
tively structured economic inequality, while also restricting the ability of legislatures 
to remedy it. Second, while economic inequality has become a cause célèbre only in 
the last few years, much of the constitutional doctrine that has contributed to its 
flourishing is longstanding. Moreover, for several decades, even the Court’s more 
liberal members have offered only tepid opposition to economically regressive con-
stitutional interpretations, sometimes helping shape them. Third, while much consti-
tutional law relating to the distribution of economic and political power and the non-
existence of social welfare rights now seems indisputable, sometimes even 
quintessentially American, regressive holdings were, in fact, hotly contested and 
deeply divided. Indeed, the losing side had equally strong, if not stronger, doctrinal 
arguments.  
As discussed in Part III, these descriptive observations, in turn, form the basis for 
three claims about the future of constitutional law. First, judges matter. Progressives 
ought not lose sight of the importance of judicial appointments. Although strong ar-
guments counsel against turning to courts as primary agents for social and economic 
change, courts are critical in constructing the political economy. Second, for those 
who object to economic inequality, mere resistance to the Trump agenda and efforts 
to return to the constitutional status quo ante are not enough. In particular, the liberal 
embrace of judicial minimalism has contributed to the judicial fortification of eco-
nomic inequality; a fundamental shift is needed. Third, such change is plausible, not 
utopian. Doctrine that now often seems natural is by no means fixed. Particularly if 
Americans begin to challenge inequality in the political and social realm, constitu-
tional change in the courts will become not only imperative but also achievable. 
I. LABOR 
The rise of economic inequality in the United States has numerous causes, but the 
decline of unions is chief among them. Between 1973 and today, union membership 
rates fell from about a third of the private sector workforce to about 6% of that work-
force.30 Scholars estimate that up to one-third of the increase in income inequality 
across recent decades is attributable to this decline.31 The decline in union strength 
is also a critical factor in explaining the rise in political inequality.32 Without the 
benefit of organization, workers have declining influence not only in their work-
places, but also in policy making at the state and federal levels.33 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. See, e.g., Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage 
Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 513–514 (2011). 
 31. See id. at 514 (“[D]eunionization explains a fifth of the inequality increase for women 
and a third for men.”).  
 32. See, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW 
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 142 
(2010); SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 325–26 (2012). 
 33. See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
NEW GILDED AGE 2, 344 (2nd ed. 2016); GILENS, supra note 2, at 79–81, 157–58; HACKER & 
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The link between law and union decline has long been a subject of scholarly in-
terest. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) purports to protect the ability of 
private sector employees to organize unions, bargain collectively, and engage in con-
certed action.34 Yet, as many legal scholars have detailed, the statute is largely in-
effective in fulfilling its promise.35 Numerous reform proposals have been offered.36  
But the statute is not the only problem; constitutional doctrine has reinforced and 
exacerbated the decline in workers’ collective power.37 Consider, for example, the 
willingness of the Court to permit governmental discrimination against striking 
workers. Workers’ ability to strike—to exercise collective power in support of their 
economic demands—derives in large part from their ability to sustain themselves 
without a wage. Yet the Supreme Court in Lyng v. UAW38 ruled that Congress could 
permissibly deny food stamps to strikers because they are strikers, even though it 
provides the benefits to workers who are impoverished or unemployed for other 
reasons.39  
For more than twenty-five years, this holding has been a fact of labor law, subject 
to little discussion or debate; states discriminate against strikers with regard to the 
provision of other benefits as well, and the law is one of many reasons why workers 
have difficulty sustaining a strike.40  
Yet the now-orthodox doctrine was far from so when issued. When the Court de-
cided Lyng, it did so only by overruling a lower-court opinion that relied on well-
                                                                                                                 
 
PIERSON, supra note 32, at 28–29, 56–61, 127–32; ROSENFELD, supra note 3, at 170–81; 
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 69–95; Thomas Byrne Edsall, The Changing Shape of 
Power: A Realignment in Public Policy, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 
1930–1980, at 269, 269 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989); Monica Davey, With Fewer 
Members, a Diminished Political Role for Wisconsin Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/with-fewer-members-a-diminished-political-role-
for-wisconsin-unions.html [https://perma.cc/YG5G-W8EX].  
 34. National Labor Relations Act §§ 1, 7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (2012). 
 35. See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 13–36, 40–45 (2016) (col-
lecting literature describing failures of NLRA). 
 36. Id. at 40–45.  
 37. For examination of how the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the NLRA more 
generally, see JULIUS G. GETMAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON UNIONS: WHY LABOR LAW IS 
FAILING AMERICAN WORKERS (2016); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner 
Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265 
(1978). For a short essay on how the Court has used constitutional doctrine to constrain labor, 
see Mark Barenberg, Constitutional Constraints on Redistribution Through Class Power, 5 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 313 (1999). 
 38. 485 U.S. 360 (1988). 
 39. Id. at 362 (upholding 1981 amendment to the Food Stamp Act which provided that 
“no household shall become eligible to participate in the food stamp program during the time 
that any member of the household is on strike or shall increase the allotment of food stamps 
that it was receiving already because the income of the striking member has decreased”). 
 40. There are numerous other obstacles to successful strikes in the contemporary econ-
omy, including the permissibility of permanent replacements; like the doctrine discussed 
above, this rule was doctrinally created and is not prescribed by the statute. See NLRB v. 
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938) (opining, in dicta, that an employer could 
permanently replace employees during an economic strike). 
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established precedent.41 Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, 
dissented, explaining that the majority’s approach contradicted the animus line of 
equal protection cases.42 The Food Stamp Amendment’s purpose, Marshall wrote, 
was to serve as a weapon against unions in labor disputes, a purpose “admittedly 
irreconcilable with the legitimate goals of the food stamp program. No other purpose 
can adequately explain the especially harsh treatment reserved for strikers and their 
families by the 1981 enactment.”43 Accordingly, the amendment should have failed 
even rational basis review.44 Had Marshall persuaded one more of his colleagues, the 
case would have come out the other way (only eight justices heard the case).  
That said, even Marshall’s compelling dissent offered a relatively weak defense 
of workers’ right to exercise their collective power to obtain a greater share of eco-
nomic resources. What rendered the law unconstitutional, in Marshall’s view, was 
that Congress was seeking to harm a particular social group, not that Congress was 
burdening the right of workers to strike.45 In contrast, District Judge Oberdorfer’s 
opinion in the lower court, drawing on earlier precedent, contained seeds for a more 
robust constitutional protection of union rights. Judge Oberdorfer pointed not only 
to congressional animus to a particular group, but also to the workers’ constitutional 
rights to “express themselves about union matters free of coercion by the govern-
ment.”46 Justice Marshall might also have reasoned, as have other judges and justices, 
that the right to strike is central to liberty, protected by both the Due Process Clause 
and the Thirteenth Amendment.47  
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on labor picketing and secondary boycotts 
reveals a similar dynamic. Since the late 1940s, the Court has upheld many 
antipicketing laws that undermine the redistributive power of unions, producing doc-
trine that now seems uncontestable.48 But the decisions, when issued, were by no 
means foreordained, or even well supported, by then-existing precedent. For exam-
ple, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc.49 the Court 
upheld the state injunction of a peaceful picket of a gravel pit, where the picket signs 
simply read, “The men on this job are not 100% affiliated with the A.F.L.”50 The 
Court reasoned “that picketing, even though ‘peaceful,’ involved more than just com-
munication of ideas” and the state was therefore entitled to great leeway in restricting 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. UAW v. Lyng, 648 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd, 485 U.S. 360 (1988). 
 42. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 384–85 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 385. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 381–82. 
 46. Lyng, 648 F. Supp. at 1239. 
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it.51 Three of eight justices objected, pointing out that the Court was stepping away 
from its prior precedent and allowing a return to the Gilded Era law such that “legis-
latures are free to decide whether to permit or suppress any particular picket line for 
any reason other than a blanket policy against all picketing.”52  
Beginning in the 1950s, the Court also upheld federal restrictions on secondary 
boycotts, adopted as part of the 1947 Taft Hartley Act.53 The statutory provisions and 
the Court’s related doctrine are complicated, to say the least.54 For purposes of this 
discussion, what is important is that the Supreme Court has held that Congress can 
constitutionally prohibit workers from picketing a business other than their own em-
ployer, like a supplier or distributor of the employer’s products, with the aim of pres-
suring the non-employer business to help the workers’ cause. As the Court wrote in 
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco),55 although a complete 
ban against peaceful labor picketing may not be permissible, secondary picketing can 
be banned because “[s]uch picketing spreads labor discord by coercing a neutral 
party to join the fray.”56  
The Court thus allowed states and Congress to extinguish a form of associational 
and expressive activity that had been extremely effective in helping workers organize 
on a class-wide basis to achieve substantial wage increases.57 In fact, the conse-
quences for unions’ redistributive power are perhaps even more significant today 
than when the statute was first enacted. Because the U.S. labor market has become 
increasingly fissured, replete with subcontracting, the prohibition on secondary ac-
tivity makes it difficult for workers to effect economic pressure on the corporate en-
tity that actually wields power over their jobs.58  
Though liberal justices dissented from several of the secondary boycott and pick-
eting decisions,59 they also played an unfortunate role in bolstering the doctrine. 
Justice Stevens and Blackmun concurred in Safeco, for example,60 and in NLRB v. 
Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Treefruits),61 Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. Vogt, 354 U.S. at 289, 294; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 
(1982) (holding state regulation of non-labor picketing is subject to strict constitutional 
scrutiny).  
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 54. For further explanation and critique, see GETMAN, supra note 37, at 90–100; Catherine 
Fisk & Jessica Rutter, Labor Protest Under the New First Amendment, 36 BERKELEY. J. EMP. 
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 55. 447 U.S. 607 (1980). 
 56. Id. at 616.  
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118 (2002). 
 58. See Andrias, supra note 35, at 23–24, 32, 82. 
 59. See, e.g., Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 60. Id. at 616 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
 61. 377 U.S. 58 (1964). 
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Brennan, writing for the majority, declined to find the statute unconstitutional.62 
Instead, he engaged in herculean efforts at constitutional avoidance, narrowing the 
statute such that it no longer forbids consumer-focused picketing.63 The result, 
however, was a doctrine in tension with basic tenets of the Court’s First Amendment 
doctrine more generally.64 As Justice Black countered:  
In short, we have neither a case in which picketing is banned because the 
picketers are asking others to do something unlawful nor a case in which 
all picketing is, for reasons of public order, banned. Instead, we have a 
case in which picketing, otherwise lawful, is banned only when the pick-
eters express particular views. The result is an abridgement of the free-
dom of these picketers to tell a part of the public their side of a labor 
controversy, a subject the free discussion of which is protected by the 
First Amendment.65 
Indeed, earlier precedent provided grounds for striking down the secondary boy-
cott provisions not only because of First Amendment principles in general but also 
because of the importance of worker association to the freedom of speech in partic-
ular. In 1946, Justice Murphy wrote the majority opinion in Thornhill v. Alabama,66 
striking down a state law that criminalized labor picketing.67 Murphy emphasized 
that labor speech in particular must be protected by the Constitution.68 He put it this 
way: “[L]abor relations are not matters of mere local or private concern. Free discus-
sion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears 
to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular 
government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.”69 Similarly, in Hague 
v. CIO,70 the Court reasoned that the  
freedom to disseminate information concerning the provisions of the 
National Labor Relations Act, to assemble peaceably for discussion of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 76; see also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (holding that union’s peaceful distribution of handbills 
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Working Paper No. 67, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3028965 
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 65. Id. at 79 (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
 66. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
 67. Id. at 102 (“[T]he dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute 
must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution.”). 
 68. Id. at 103.  
 69. Id.  
 70. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
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the Act, and of the opportunities and advantages offered by it, is a privi-
lege or immunity of a citizen of the United States secured against state 
abridgement by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.71  
The point here is not that restrictions on labor speech were an accident of his-
tory—of course they were not. Developments in American politics and law over the 
course of the twentieth century render the Court’s retreat from Thornhill and Hague 
unsurprising.72 The point is simply that viable alternative doctrinal paths existed. 
* * * 
In recent months, right-wing state legislators have introduced a host of legislation 
seeking to impose even greater limitations on protest and labor picketing in particu-
lar.73 While the media has depicted these laws as part of the Trump phenomenon, the 
above discussion suggests the extent to which they represent a continuation rather 
than a rupture with the past. The Court’s longstanding secondary boycott doctrine, 
together with the Court’s other case law on labor picketing, sanctions significant lim-
itations on the right to demonstrate and facilitates a dramatic weakening of labor’s 
bargaining power. At the same time, this doctrine was by no means foreordained by 
precedent. It was the product of close votes, with compelling arguments pointing the 
other way.  
Other examples of the Court reinforcing inegalitarian distributions of power exist 
throughout constitutional labor cases, including in the area of organizing rights, 
where the Court has protected employer rights to campaign against unionization but 
permitted significant restrictions on the speech rights of union organizers;74 and in 
the area of public sector unionism, where the Court has found no constitutional right 
to bargain or strike, permitting states to restrict and even ban collective bargaining 
among public employees.75  
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The Court has not only refused to intervene when legislators restrict workers’ 
right to engage in concerted action. Critically, the Court has also invoked the 
Constitution to disable state and local governments from protecting union rights. For 
example, at the same time as the Court has found that state laws restricting picketing 
and other union expression are not preempted, the Court, under the ambit of the 
Supremacy Clause, has held preempted nearly all state laws that have the effect of 
protecting workers’ right to organize.76 Indeed, despite having crafted a market-par-
ticipant exception to preemption doctrine, the Court has even rejected state efforts to 
ensure their own spending neutrality on contested labor matters.77 Thus, the Court 
recently struck down a California statute prohibiting grant recipients and private em-
ployers receiving substantial state program funds from using such funds “to assist, 
promote, or deter union organizing.”78 Notably, the opinion disabling the state law 
was written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justice Souter as well as the conserva-
tive Justices. Only Justices Breyer and Ginsburg dissented.  
The Court now appears poised to go further in disabling unions. Most observers 
expect that within the next year, the Court will constitutionalize a “right-to-work” 
regime—that is, it will strike down state and local laws that allow public sector em-
ployers and their unions to negotiate “fair-share agreements.”79 These agreements 
avoid a free-rider problem by requiring all employees covered by a union contract to 
contribute to the cost of union representation, though not to the cost of political ac-
tivity; they have been permitted for decades.80 Over the last few years, however, the 
five-justice conservative majority has begun moving to render such agreements un-
constitutional. Most recently, in Harris v. Quinn,81 Justice Alito critiqued Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education,82 the long-standing precedent that allows fair-share 
agreements; he stopped short of reversing it, holding only that such agreements vio-
lated the First Amendment when applied to quasi-public sector homecare workers.83 
In 2016, in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n,84 the Court was expected to ex-
tend Harris, holding that the Constitution prohibits fair-share agreements of any sort 
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2018] THE FORTIFICATION OF INEQUALITY  17 
 
in the public sector.85 With Justice Scalia’s death, the Court split 4-4, deciding the 
case without opinion, affirming the opinion below, and thus letting stand existing 
doctrine.86 Now, however, Justice Gorsuch is widely expected to provide the fifth 
vote for prohibiting fair-share agreements.87  
If, as anticipated, the Court imposes, as a matter of constitutional law, a “right-to-
work” or “open-shop” regime on all public-sector worksites across the country, ir-
respective of state and local government preferences, the result will likely be sharply 
declining resources and diminishing power for an already weakened labor move-
ment. As Justice Kagan pointed out in her dissent in Harris, this result is far from 
compelled; the conservative majority on the Court is reaching for it.88 Contrary to 
principles of stare decisis, constitutionalizing a ban on fair-share agreements would 
reverse long-standing precedent on which governments and unions have relied.89 
Moreover, as Kagan wrote, constitutionalizing a ban on fair-share agreements would 
run contrary to other areas of doctrine, setting up the possibility of a “serious anom-
aly” in the area of public employee speech—“a different legal standard . . . applying 
exclusively to union fees.” 90 That is, if the Court’s opinion is taken to its logical 
conclusion, the expressive interests of workers objecting to payment of union fees 
would be given greater weight than the expressive interests of public employees in 
all other contexts; conversely, the managerial rights of the state when acting as em-
ployer would be given less weight in this context than in any other.91  
Kagan’s dissent thus expertly points out the extent to which the Court is actively 
working to disable unions. At the same time, Kagan’s dissent might be critiqued for 
what it lacks: a robust defense of unions and workers’ collective rights. Invoking 
Abood, Kagan’s dissent rests the government’s interest in fair-share agreements on 
the need to promote industrial peace and protect managerial prerogative.92 Missing 
from this account is Justice Murphy’s embrace of the role that unions play in advanc-
ing public debate or protecting workers’ liberties—or other judicial articulation of 
the constitutional rights of workers.93 
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II. EDUCATION 
While education as a field is almost entirely distinct from labor, courts have 
played a similar role in fortifying inequality here. The American education system 
today is characterized by an extraordinary degree of inequity on the basis of wealth.94 
In recent years, the achievement gap between more and less affluent children has 
grown wider, as has the gap in resources allocated.95 One component of the problem 
is the absence of affordable, quality preschool and daycare.96 Another is the great 
disparity in educational resources in elementary and secondary public schooling, 
where a system of funding by local property taxes results in schools in poor neigh-
borhoods receiving a fraction of what schools in affluent neighborhoods receive.97 
Considerable interstate variation exists as well.98 Meanwhile, American higher edu-
cation is increasingly populated by elites. At many of the best-ranked colleges in 
America, more students come from the top 1% of the income scale than from the 
entire bottom 60%.99 Less than 0.5% of children from the bottom fifth of American 
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families attend an elite college, while less than half attend any college at all.100 Those 
low-income students who do make it to college are saddled by increasing amounts 
of debt.101 
Some scholars argue that inequality in education is a primary driver of economic 
inequality.102 Others believe the inverse: that rising economic inequality has fueled 
educational inequality.103 But whichever way the causal arrow runs, educational in-
equality results in diminished social mobility and limited opportunity for Americans 
at the bottom, and increasingly for those in the shrinking middle as well.104 
As with labor, constitutional doctrine has reinforced and exacerbated inequality 
in education. Most famously, in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez,105 the Court rejected a constitutional challenge by poor students in Texas 
to a school-funding scheme that resulted in significant disparities between schools in 
poor and wealthy neighborhoods.106 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell 
reasoned that the statute did not expressly categorize on the basis of wealth, nor, in 
his view, did the property-tax regime effectively discriminate against a definable 
group.107 After all, Powell explained, some poor students lived in property-rich 
school districts.108 And although Justice Powell left open the possibility that a hypo-
thetical state’s complete denial of a basic, minimal education might violate the 
Constitution, he rejected the argument that the Constitution provided a fundamental  
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right to education.109 
Since Rodriguez, the received wisdom has been that the judicially enforced U.S. 
Constitution does not have anything to say about funding disparities in public school, 
nor does it provide guarantees of welfare rights or require heightened scrutiny for 
laws that burden the poor, including poor children.110 Firmly part of constitutional 
orthodoxy, these principles are generally accepted even by the Court’s most liberal 
Justices, and conceded by many liberal scholars.111 That said, it is hard not to con-
clude that Rodriguez’s dissenters, and the Texas school children, had strong doctrinal 
arguments on their side. As Justice White pointed out in dissent, the Texas scheme 
lacked rational basis.112 The state argued that its funding scheme was justified by an 
interest in local control, but, in fact, the Texas system utterly failed to advance that 
interest.113 Equalizing funding through the property tax, which was the primary rev-
enue-raising mechanism extended to school districts, was practically and legally un-
available to poor districts.114 Justice Brennan agreed that the statute could not pass 
even rational basis review, but he wrote separately to emphasize that strict scrutiny 
should have applied.115 After all, he opined, “education is inextricably linked to the 
right to participate in the electoral process and to the rights of free speech and asso-
ciation guaranteed by the First Amendment.”116  
Justice Marshall offered the most full-throated indictment of the majority opin-
ion—one that encapsulates several of the observations of this Essay. The Court, he 
made clear, was playing an active role in reinforcing inequality: it was assenting to 
a state’s decision to “vary the quality of education which it offers its children in ac-
cordance with the amount of taxable wealth located in the school districts within 
which they reside;” it was “acquiesc[ing] in a system which deprives children in their 
earliest years of the chance to reach their full potential as citizens.”117 Moreover, 
Justice Marshall wrote, the majority’s decision was by no means required by 
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Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1824–25 (2001) (describing consensus that con-
stitutional welfare rights are off-the-table); see also United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) 
(upholding filing fee for bankruptcy petitions); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485–87 
(1970) (holding that state welfare determinations receive only minimal scrutiny and declining 
to determine whether state had adequately accounted for needs of children in large family).  
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 112. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 67–68 (White, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. at 68.  
 114. Id. at 68–69. 
 115. Id. at 62–63 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. at 63. 
 117. Id. at 70–71 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
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precedent.118 Rather, the opinion represented “an abrupt departure from the 
mainstream of recent state and federal court decisions concerning the 
unconstitutionality of state educational financing schemes dependent upon taxable 
local wealth” and “a retreat from our historic commitment to equality of educational 
opportunity.”119 And, he offered a powerful retort to the argument, advanced recently 
even by liberals, that courts were inappropriate venues for addressing economic 
inequality: 
Nor can I accept the notion that it is sufficient to remit these appellees to 
the vagaries of the political process which, contrary to the majority's sug-
gestion, has proved singularly unsuited to the task of providing a remedy 
for this discrimination. I, for one, am unsatisfied with the hope of an ul-
timate “political” solution sometime in the indefinite future while, in the 
meantime, countless children unjustifiably receive inferior educations 
that “may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be un-
done.”120  
In the years since Rodriguez, school children’s constitutional arguments have not 
gone away. Rather, they have been taken up in state courts, with some modest suc-
cess. Several state supreme courts, including eventually Texas’s, have found that the 
failure to provide an adequate, basic education violates state constitutional guaran-
tees; others have found that unequal funding violates state equal protection princi-
ples.121 Recent studies suggest that such litigation has been at least marginally effec-
tive in remedying disparities and improving conditions.122 Indeed, the state 
constitutional law path may even have produced better doctrine, or at least more ex-
perimentation, than would have resulted had the Court reached the opposite 
conclusion in Rodriguez. But the absence of federal constitutional rights came at a 
cost—particularly for poor students in jurisdictions where state courts refused to 
recognize a right to equal or adequate education.123  
Rodriguez represents a decision by the Court to assent to systems characterized 
by egregious inequality and deprivation, in the name of deferring to the political 
process. But what if the federal political process were to try to deliver on 
redistributive goals in the area of education? For example, in recent months, public 
attention has focused on the vast numbers of working-class students who are saddled 
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with extraordinary amounts of college tuition debt.124 Long considered a political 
impossibility, calls for free college tuition have been gaining popular support and 
some legislative backing.125 To be sure, no federal bill could be enacted anytime 
soon. But what if the politics were to change sufficiently to enable Congress to enact 
a new tuition spending program—a program designed to encourage states to provide 
free tuition at public community colleges, for example?126  
Here, as well, the specter of regressive constitutional doctrine would loom large. 
Consider the Court’s recent opinion in the Affordable Care Act case, National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB),127 where the Court held that 
a congressional spending program unconstitutionally coerced the states.128 Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito went so far as to assert that any sufficiently large 
cooperative spending program could be coercive.129 If the federal government offers 
a substantial sum of money, making it politically, if not practically, impossible for 
the states to say “no,” the federal government would be violating principles of fed-
eralism.130  
The controlling plurality opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, was nar-
rower. It held only that Congress cannot tie a large new spending program to an 
entrenched program if doing so effectively denies states a choice about whether to 
abandon the entrenched program.131 As such, the tuition bill that some Democrats 
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expand coverage to residents with an income below 133% of the federal poverty level. Id. at 
2607–08. 
 129. See id. at 2661–63 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).  
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For an explanation of why existing spending programs are not likely to be found coercive 
under the plurality opinion, see Pasachoff, supra note 126. But see Rick Hills, Fair-Weather 
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have sponsored would likely survive under the plurality opinion: the proposed bill 
would create a new spending program, without leveraging an existing one. 
Nonetheless, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out in dissent, even this narrower rule is 
“unsettling.”132 As a formal matter, it restrains Congress’s ability to assist the needy, 
treating earlier congressional decisions as binding on future Congresses.133 Perhaps 
most “unsettling” is that Justices Breyer and Kagan signed on to this unprecedented 
restriction on Congress’s power to spend for the general welfare.134 
III. A JUST DOCTRINE, WITHOUT UTOPIANISM 
A significant body of scholarship by constitutional law scholars, including my-
self, emphasizes the extent to which courts are unlikely leaders of progressive social 
change, particularly in the absence of well-organized social movements.135 As the 
above sketch indicates, when it comes to redistribution of economic resources and 
political power, court skeptics can find ample support for their position. In constitu-
tional cases involving labor and education, the Supreme Court has fortified legisla-
tion that perpetuates inequality while disabling, or threatening to disable, legislatures 
from redistributing economic resources and power.136 Against this backdrop, and 
particularly given the current Court’s makeup, relying on litigation as the primary 
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method for opposing economic inequality makes little tactical sense. Moreover, there 
are normative reasons why those who oppose inequality should favor social move-
ment building and political organizing over an excessive focus on litigation.137  
But the claim that progressives ought to focus on political organizing does not tell 
us anything about what judges ought to do when confronted with cases. Nor does the 
recognition that the Court has, in practice, frequently favored elite interests deprive 
particular judges of agency. Indeed, while some justices have made choices to rein-
force economic inequality and to constrain the ability of political actors to remedy it, 
others have resisted, often with strong arguments from precedent, text, and history 
on their side.138  
Unfortunately, in recent decades, even liberal justices have offered only tepid op-
position to economically regressive doctrine, frequently accepting it as part of legal 
orthodoxy.139 Liberal constitutional theory has, to great extent, encouraged this ap-
proach.140 Prominent scholars have cautioned judges to interpret the Constitution 
“minimally” so as to avoid contentious value choices.141 Some who urge judicial 
minimalism are motivated by a worry about political backlash.142 Others are skeptical 
about judicial capacity and expertise.143 Still others fear over-empowering courts 
—because of either a normative commitment to the supremacy of democratic 
institutions  
or a worry that courts will always favor elite interests.144 
 These concerns are not entirely without merit, as I have previously acknowledged,  
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and as the history of regressive court decisions suggests.145 But the doctrine also 
underlines a fundamental weakness with the commitment to judicial minimalism. 
The reigning approach has encouraged liberal justices, wary of judicial activism, to 
acquiesce to legislation and common law rules that promote inequality. Meanwhile, 
even in dissent, and even when colleagues have disabled legislators’ ability to reme-
diate inequality, liberal justices have frequently failed to develop robust accounts of 
countervailing substantive constitutional rights.146 
Thus, for those who object to rising economic inequality, resistance to the Trump 
agenda and efforts to return to constitutional status quo ante are insufficient. 
Fundamental constitutional rethinking on issues of economic inequality is neces-
sary—in the areas of labor, education, and beyond. Professor Mark Tushnet’s argu-
ment against “defensive crouch liberalism,” offered previously and again in this sym-
posium, is perhaps nowhere more apposite than here.147  
Professor Tushnet urges a “utopian” approach to constitutional theory, including 
in the area of social welfare rights.148 As he points out, claims about social welfare 
rights are unlikely to prevail before the current Supreme Court.149 The same is true 
for labor rights and educational equity and adequacy claims. More long-term consti-
tutional thinking is necessary. But “utopian”—that is, “impossibly ideal,”150 or 
“imaginary and indefinitely remote”151—may be a misframing of the constitutional 
theory needed.152 Utopianism, in history, has often had a dark underbelly, with the 
promise of a better world invoked to excuse sordid acts of tyranny.153 A term that 
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carries such ugly connotations ought to give us pause. Moreover, a more just and 
egalitarian constitutional law doctrine is not actually utopian. As the preceding dis-
cussion highlights, the doctrine that has helped fortify inequality in the areas of labor 
and education is the product of close votes. Contrary outcomes are easy to imagine; 
they are neither impossible nor remote.  
The point may be semantic, but it is nonetheless consequential. To the extent 
scholars refer to redistributive claims as utopian, they risk understating the doctrinal, 
textual, and historical support for a progressive constitutional vision.154 The frame of 
utopianism implies that the past and present must be erased, rather than built upon. 
(Relatedly, utopianism’s departure from reality might also lead advocates to 
undervalue important countervailing concerns, not unlike errors of utopians past.) 
More concretely, the frame of utopianism risks discouraging legislators and social 
movements opposing inequality from making constitutional claims in the public 
arena. After all, why make arguments that seem impossible?155 Finally, and perhaps 
most troubling, a frame of utopianism risks letting judges off the hook for their 
choices, by suggesting that alternatives are unsupported, impracticable, or im-
possibly ideal.  
In fact, a more just and egalitarian constitutional doctrine can still find significant 
doctrinal toeholds (as well as historical and textual grounding).156 Return, again, to 
the case of labor picketing. Recent First Amendment jurisprudence in contexts other 
than labor emphasizes the importance of strict scrutiny for content-based regula-
tion.157 This new case law strengthens the claim that the secondary boycott doctrine 
is wrongly decided. A local union in California has taken up this point, arguing be-
fore the NLRB that section 8(b)(4)(i) of the NLRA is unconstitutional.158 Meanwhile, 
Justice Murphy’s full-throated endorsement of workers’ role in the public debate, 
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offered in Thornhill, remains good law, as do other endorsements of workers’ con-
stitutional rights to liberty, equality, association, and freedom.159 A doctrine that not 
only applies existing First Amendment precedent but also begins to flesh out an af-
firmative theory of constitutional labor rights is thus both imaginable and nonremote. 
Consider also a recent case from Detroit, Michigan. In the fall of 2016, school 
children in Detroit sued the state for denying them literacy.160 As their complaint 
details, their schools are decrepit, unsafe, filled with rodents, and lacking both teach-
ers and basic supplies.161 At one Detroit school, less than 5% of third graders scored 
“proficient” on Michigan’s English assessment test.162 As a result, the students are 
denied a basic, minimal education in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Though a long shot before the current Supreme Court, the students’ arguments find 
ample support in doctrine. Despite Rodriguez, numerous Supreme Court cases make 
clear the fundamental importance of public education,163 while others, including re-
cent opinions, hold that heightened or strict scrutiny applies when a fundamental 
interest is denied or burdened by the state on an unequal basis.164  
That is not to say that these arguments will prevail in the near term. A doctrine 
that permits, and even requires, provision of education or other social welfare goods 
or protection of union rights will likely require new social movements and new ap-
pointees to the Supreme Court. (Notably, the Detroit complaint was filed when many 
observers believed President Obama’s appointee, Judge Merrick Garland, would be 
confirmed to the Supreme Court.) But new social struggles and new justices can pro-
duce new outcomes.165  
Indeed, there are a few reasons to be hopeful. In opposing Trump’s nominees and 
legislative agenda, groups of citizens have coalesced around support for a right to 
quality public education—one not privatized for profit motive or limited to certain 
residents.166 They have spoken out in support of health care for the needy and perhaps 
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for all.167 And they have rallied behind a more robust conception of workers’ 
rights.168 Meanwhile, a few judges and Justices are beginning to draw attention to 
how the law fortifies inequality, to take up constitutional claims against economic 
inequality, and to flesh out substantive constitutional arguments in support of a more 
egalitarian distribution of power and resources.169 In short, a constitutional vision 
that diminishes, rather than fortifies, economic inequality may be hard to achieve, 
but it is neither unimaginable nor impossibly ideal.  
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